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This study examines the impact of distance among competing bank locations on 
market their pricing behavior. A general spatial autoregressive model that nests 
both spatial autoregressive and spatial error models is used to examine the impact of 
distance on pricing behavior of 686 non-metro banks in Texas. Results show that 
non-metro banks exercise market power in pricing their products. An increase in 
spatial competition may reduce profitability and challenge long term survival of 
small community based financial institutions. 
 
 
This study examines the impact of distance among competing banks on their product 
pricing behavior. A general spatial autocorrelation model that accounts for both spatial 
autocorrelation and spatial error is used to examine the pricing behavior of non-metro 
banks in Texas. Recent studies have raised the concern that increased competition in non-
metro banking markets may reduce the profitability of small community based financial 
institutions. The long-term viability of community banks is an important issue as these 
banks continue to remain to be the primary lender for small business and agricultural 
enterprises, which are the backbone of the rural American economy (Akigbe and 
McNulty, 2003).  
  Moreover, locational effects such as the distance from the nearest competitor and 
availability of supporting infrastructure are relatively new concepts in accessing rural 
financial applications. In particular, this study estimates a general spatial autocorrelation 
(SAC) model  that accounts for both spatial dependence and spatial heterogeneity in 
pricing behavior that may arise in community banking markets mainly because of 
difference in the supply of supporting infrastructure such as broadband internet network 
(Anselin, 1988). Recent deregulation of the banking sector and innovations in financial and 
information technologies have substantially increased competition in markets which were 
primarily served by community based financial institutions. While the deregulation 
allowed large regional and national banks to operate branch locations in community 
banking markets, increasing demand for online services particularly from web savvy 
customers has made it possible for mega banks to penetrate into geographically isolated 
(non metro) markets without investing resources in developing branch locations. As a 
result, the number of community banking institutions as well as their deposit and asset 
share has been diminishing over time (Critfield et al., 2004; Berger et al., 2005). These 
declining trends are raising concern about the long term viability of community banks 
(Elyasiani and Mehdian, 1995; DeYoung, Hunter, and Udell, 2004). 
However, despite these deteriorating numbers, recent evidence indicates that 
community banks continue to play an important role in all types of local banking markets 
including those which experienced population declines (Critfield et al., 2004). Moreover, 
a number of studies have observed that non-metro community banks are more profit 
efficient than their urban counterparts (Boyd and Runkle, 1993; Berger and Mester, 1997; 
McNulty et al., 2001; Akhigbe and McNulty, 2003). In particular, community banks’ 
ability to access needs and creditworthiness of borrowers particularly those without long 
credit histories makes them a more efficient lender than large banks that tend to rely on 
hard information in making lending decisions. The relative efficiency of community 
banks might be the force behind a larger number of De Novo community bank entries 
(more than 1250) after 1991 when unit banking was completely removed (Berger et al., 
2004; Critfield et al., 2004). Berger, Goldberg, and White (2001) observed that De Novo small banks tend to lend a significantly higher proportion of loans (13.6 percent) to small 
borrowers who tend to be informationally opaque as compared to their larger counterparts 
(2.9 percent). 
However, most studies attribute the higher efficiency of non-metro banks to 
market power and raise concern about their long term viability as the deregulation and 
technology induced competition intensifies (Elyasiani and Mehdian, 1995; DeYoung, 
Hunter, and Udell, 2004; Akhigbe and McNulty, 2003). This effect would be more 
pronounced in non-metro areas which tend to be highly concentrated. If these small 
community-based financial organizations are inefficient then large regional and national 
banks would enter these market areas. The enhanced competition in non-metro markets 
could force local market disruptions and decrease the supply of funds particularly to 
those small borrowers without extended credit histories. Even if these inefficient non-
metro community banks are purchased by larger banks, it is likely to reduce the supply of 
small business loans because larger banks tend to lend relatively smaller proportions of 
their funds to smaller borrowers (Berger, Goldberg, and White, 2001; Berger et al., 
2004). 
Moreover, although many studies have recognized that bank performance differs 
by location, its actual impact has not yet been fully explored. In particular, firms that are 
geographically isolated may behave differently from those that are competing with a next 
door neighbor. Therefore, it is important to account for the proximity of competing banks 
in evaluating their pricing behavior. Moreover, the level of consumers demand for 
internet based banking services depends on the available supporting infrastructure such as 
broadband internet services, number of other customers using such services (network externalities), and other socioeconomic conditions of bank customers. As a result, 
community banks operating in remote locations are likely to have fewer internet savvy 
customers and face limited internet based competition than their urban counterparts.   
This study employs a comprehensive modeling framework to examine the pricing 
behavior of community banks using Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income (Call 
Report) data for 651 Texas community banks that were active as of December 31, 2005. 
In particular, a general spatial autocorrelation model that embeds both spatial 
autoregressive (SAR) and spatial error (SEM) models is developed to account for 
possible locational differences in basic infrastructure among community banking markets 
(Anselin,1988). Consistent with Pinske and Slade (2002) and LeSage and Pace (2004) a 
number of instrumental variables and spatial error weight matrices are developed to 
address the issue of endogeneity and spatial impact on non-metro bank’s pricing 
behavior. 
Empirical Model 
Location plays a vital role in determining the market structure and profitability of 
community-based financial institutions. Since customers typically travel to a bank 
location to complete their transaction, factors such as travel cost, search cost, and other 
costs associated with informational asymmetries factor in the total cost of choosing one 
bank over another. As a result, an institution which is located closer to customers than its 
competitors may posses some degree of market power in pricing its services (Greenhut 
and Greenhut, 1975; Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1992). This study estimates an empirical 
spatial pricing model to examine the extent of market power and its impact on the 
average price of banking services.   Following Pinske, Slade and Brett (2002) and Richards and Acharya (2006), we 
assume banks serve as upstream suppliers of financial services demanded by downstream 
borrowers and depositors. Assuming that there are K buyers of q=(q1, q2, …, qn) banking 
products and the borrowers are located at a point in geographic or product characteristic 
space the aggregate profit function for the borrowing industry can be expressed as  
(1) ) , , ( ~ ) , , ( ~ y p v y p v k k ∑ = Π π , 
where v=(v1, v2, …,vn) 
T is borrower’s output price vector, p=(p1, p2, …, pn) is a price 
vector for banking services, and y=(y1, y2, …, yn) is borrower’s output vector. 
  Pinske, Slade and Brett (2002) approximate the profit equation in (1) using 
normalized quadratic function and derive aggregate demand function for the borrowing 
industry by invoking Hotelling’s Lemma. The credit supply function can be derived from 
the objective function of a representative lender 
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where ci firm i’s marginal cost and Fi is a fixed cost. Given rival prices, lender’s reaction 
function or best reply function (R(p)) can be derived by solving the first order condition 
of maximizing (2), i.e., 
(3)   u Gp X a p R p + + + = = β ) ( , 
where a is a vector of intercepts and β is a vector of parameters to be estimated. The 
matrix G=(gij) has zero diagonal elements and may contain non-zero off diagonal 
elements that must be estimated.  
  The reaction function (3) contains current rival prices and may not be independent 
of the error term u. Pinske, Slade, and Brett (2002) suggest developing exogenous instruments that vary by location such as population and local wage rate. We use zip code 
level data on median household income, total population, and total household as 
instruments and estimate price reaction function of following form 
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where p=average interest rate on bank loans, W1 and W2 are spatial weight matrices, X is 
vector of exogenous variables that includes four input prices (price of deposits, average 
wage rate, cost of physical capital, and average cost of financial capital), variables that 
vary by branch location (total population, total households, and average household 
income by for the zip code area served by the branch location), number of competitor in 
the market, and a dummy variable indicating whether the bank is a member of a multi-
bank holding company.  
Data Description 
 
The empirical data used in this study comes from three different sources. The bank 
financial data was drawn from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (FDIC) 
Reports on Statistics on Depository Institutions (RSDI) and Summary of Deposits (SOD). 
The FDIC provides a complete set of financial statements for all reporting banks, from 
which we draw loan and deposit amounts, physical capital, number of employees and 
other operating characteristics. The variable that vary by location such as zip code level 
population, total number of households, and median household income was drawn from  
the 2000 U.S. Census database.   In addition to financial and census data, US Census TIGER line files containing 
local road networks are used to generate geo-coordinates for 686 branch locations 
operating in non-metro locations (table 1). In order to focus specifically on banks located 
in rural areas, where geographic distance is most likely to be a key differentiating 
attribute, we study the entire population of non-metro banks in Texas. We choose banks 
in Texas for several reasons. First, the Texas is one of the major agriculturally-intensive 
regions in the U.S. Because our interest in this study lies in understanding the linkage 
between banking market power and rural welfare in general, loans from non-metro banks 
to both farms and rural businesses of all types are relevant.  
  Second, Texas is the largest state with large number of relatively isolated market. 
Although spatial econometric method is able to endogenize the size of the market through 
construction of the spatial weight matrix, estimates of the most relevant weights are often 
biased when a large non-included market exists on the fringe (Shaffer and DiSalvo, 
1994).  Third, Texas is one of the major community banking states, which remained 
under a unit banking system until the mid 1980s. Moreover, many of these single unit 
financial institutions are still in operation. Since most non-metro banks tend to specialize 
in relationship lending, it is important to understand how spatial competition affects 
profitability and long term survival of these small community based institutions.   
  There were 651 small community-based commercial financial institutions 
operating as of December 2005. About 40percent (221) of these community banks 
operate only one full service bank location. While more than 55 percent of the 
community banks are headquartered in non-metro locations, more than 67 percent of the 
single unit banks are located in non-metro areas. Results and Discussion 
The basic statistics on variables used in the study are reported in table 1. On average 
banks pay little more than 4 percent to obtain financial capital and charge about 9 percent 
to their borrowers. Banks are facing at least one competitor in each zip code area they 
operate and have 50 percent market share in total deposits. The market share of sample 
banks is much higher than national average reported in other studies. The corresponding 
figure for metro region in Texas is 20 percent. 
  The parameter estimates for ordinary least square (OLS), spatial autoregressive 
(SAR), and general spatial autocorrelation (SAC) models are reported in table 2. In 
general, estimated parameters are consistent with other studies and hold expected signs. 
The overall goodness of fit as reflected by R-square value (0.17-0.40) is reasonably high 
for a study based on cross-sectional data. Since retail deposits are the main source of 
financial capital for non-metro locations, the cost of financial capital is not significant in 
all 5 versions of the model reported in table 2. Other three cost variables, average cost of 
deposit, labor, and physical capita hold expected signs and are mostly significant. 
  A number of tests (Moran-I, Lagrange Multiplier (LM), likelihood ratio (LR), and 
Wald statistics) were conducted to select between SAR and SAC models and all test 
results support SAC model, which accounts for both spatial autocorrelation as well as 
spatial error. The results show that competition in non-metro banking market is spatial. 
Many non-metro branch locations enjoy a significant level of market power and price 
their services accordingly. Summary and Conclusion 
This study examined the impact of geographic distance among competing bank and their 
pricing behavior using data from non-metro banks in Texas. Although many studies have 
addressed the impact of market power in bank performance, it is not clear how distance 
between competing banks affects their pricing behavior. If the performance of non-metro 
banks, which tend to be local in scope, is primarily based on their locational advantage, 
increased competition may reduce their profitability and challenge their long term 
viability. 
  The results of this study show that non-metro banks exercise a significant level of 
market power and price their products and services accordingly. Although it is not clear 
whether the profit margin is high enough to attract new competitors in non-metro 
markets, an increase in competition is likely to challenge current pricing behavior of 
existing firms and reduce overall profitability.  References 
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  (1.73) -(5.75) -(5.41)  -(4.90)  -(5.03) 
Cost of Deposit  0.8145
** 0.7442
** 0.7298
** 0.4713  0.4630 
  (2.70) (2.58)  (2.49)  (1.65)  (1.59) 






  (2.24) (2.83)  (3.03)  (3.39)  (3.53) 






  (9.86) (10.33) (10.33)  (10.84)  (10.80) 
Cost of Financial Capital  -0.0013 -0.0004  0.0005  -0.0008  -0.0003 
  -(0.11) -(0.03)  (0.05)  -(0.07)  -(0.02) 
Number of Competitors  0.0764 0.0561  0.0598  -0.1824  -0.1795 
  (0.45) (0.35)  (0.36)  -(1.13)  -(1.08) 






  (12.87) (13.93)  (14.04)  (15.17)  (15.21) 
Population       0.0008
** 0.0008
** 
       (12.13)  (5.95) 
Total Households       -0.0018
** -0.0019
** 
       -(13.65)  -(4.59) 
Median Income       0.0002
** 0.0002
** 
       (19.39)  (11.83) 





   (8.89)  (8.03)  (2.40)  (2.83) 
λє     0.0320
*  0.0200
** 
     (2.02)    (7.18) 
R
2  0.3230 0.17  0.3877 0.3791  0.4036 
N  686 686  686  686  686 
**,* denote significance at 1 and 5 percent level. 